A bounded rationality duopoly game with delay is formulated. Its dynamical evolution is analyzed. The existence of an economic equilibrium of the game is derived. The local stability analysis has been carried out. The analysis showed that firms using delayed bounded rationality have a higher chance of reaching a Nash equilibrium point. Numerical simulations were used to show bifurcation diagrams and phase portraits.
Introduction
An oligopoly is the case where the market is controlled by a small number of firms. Even the duopoly situation, an oligopoly of two producers, can be more complex than one might imagine since the duopolists have to take into account their actions and reactions when a decision is made. Oligopoly theory is one of the oldest branches of mathematical economics dating back to 1838 when its basic model was proposed by Cournot [1, 2] . In the repeated oligopoly game all players maximize their profits. Recently, the dynamics of the duopoly game has been studied in [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . Bischi and Naimzada [5] gave the general formula of the oligopoly model with a form of bounded rationality. They discussed the global and local stability of the duopoly game with a particular form of bounded rationality. They showed that the dynamics of the game can lead to complex behavior such as cycles and chaos. Ahmed et al. [13] used the Jury condition to discuss the stability of a modification of Puu's model with bounded rationality. Agiza et al. examined the dynamical behavior of Bowley's model with bonded rationality [12] . Agiza et al. [11] have been studied the complex dynamics of a bounded rationality duopoly game with a nonlinear demand function. The modification of the duopoly game depends on the strategy that the firms use, such as homogeneous and heterogeneous; and the expectations of the output the firms have to maximize, such as bounded rationality, naive expectation and adaptive expectation, see [10, 9] . They developed duopoly game with heterogeneous players. The development of complex oligopoly dynamics theory has been reviewed in [14] . Other studies on the dynamics of oligopoly models with more firms and other modifications have been studied [15] [16] [17] 6, 18] . Also in the past decade, there has been a great deal of interest in chaos control of duopoly games because its complexity see [19, 20] and its references.
The present work aims to formulate a bounded rationality duopoly game with delay and studying its dynamical behaviors. In additions it is aimed to check if the delay case used (that is, considering markets with memory) is a more realistic assumption than the non-delay case and increases the stability of the system. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the delayed duopoly game with bounded rationality is briefly described. In Section 3, we analyze the dynamics for a simple case of a delayed duopoly game with bounded rationality. Explicit parametric conditions of the existence, local stability of equilibrium points will be given. In Section 4, we present the numerical simulations, to verify our results which taken place by the theoretical analysis. Finally, some remarks are confined in Section 5.
Delayed duopoly game with bounded rationality method
We consider a Cournot duopoly game where q i denotes the quantity supplied by firm i, i = 1, 2. In addition let P(q i + q j ), i = j, denote to a twice differentiable and nonincreasing inverse demand function and let C i (q i ) denote the twice differentiable increasing cost function. For firm i the profit resulting from the above Cournot game is given by
The profit maximizing behavior of player i, taking the quantity supplied to the opponent j, i = j, as given, results in the well-known reaction function for firm i
Cournot assumed that the expected quantity in the next time step q e j (t + 1) is given by q e j (t + 1) = q j (t). Then the Cournot duopoly game defined as a discrete dynamical system has the form
However, as pointed out by Bischi and Naimzada [5] there is an unrealistic assumption in this approach. It is implicitly assumed that the duopolist knows the market's demand function. A more realistic approach is to assume a bounded rationality i.e. each firm (say ith one) modifies its production according to its marginal profit
Hence the dynamical system of a duopoly game with a bounded rationality is
where α i (q i ) is the adjustment of the ith firm i = 1, 2. They assumed that q e j (t + 1) = q j (t) in the term of the bounded rationality and also assumed α i (q i ) = α i q i . Then the Bischi-Naimzada bounded rationality duopoly game has the form
This means that, if the marginal profit is positive/negative he increases /decreases its production q i in the next output period. Also they assumed that the expected product of a firm q e (t + 1) is equal to its previous quantity q(t) in the bounded rationality term. However it may make more sense to use previous productions i.e. q(t − 1), q(t − 2), . . . , q(t − T ) with different weights. This point of view has been studied in [13, [21] [22] [23] in a different context. Ahmed et al. and Agiza et al. have been examined this point in the monopoly case only. In [13, 21] , they assumed that delay was put in the full term of bounded rationality for all players in the game. In this paper, we think that a greater reality for this game is put the delay in the term of the bounded rationality for all players except the ith player. Here both realistic ideas of bounded rationality and delay are combined. It will be shown that delay increases the stability domain. The dynamical system will be
where
. . , T are the weights given to previous productions. From Eq. (7), it is clear that the delay was put in the bounded rationality term for all players except the player i. This argument is the basic difference between our paper and the other papers [13, 21, 24] .
Dynamics of the simple delayed duopoly game with bonded rationality
For simplicity set T = 1, and consider the duopoly case and the profit of i th firm is given by
Under the above assumption, the delayed duopoly game with bounded rationality (7) is given by
To study the stability of dynamical system (8) , rewrite it as a fourth dimensional system in the form
Equilibrium points and local stability
It is clear that the system (9) has four fixed points in the following form:
such that
Obviously, E 0 , E 1 , E 2 are boundary equilibrium points. The fixed point E * is a Nash equilibrium point and has economic meaning when
To investigate the local stability of the equilibrium points E 0 , E 1 , E 2 and E * we have find the Jacobian matrix of the system equations (9). The Jacobian matrix for the model system (9) at any point (p 1 , p 2 , q 1 , q 2 ) takes the form
The stability of equilibrium points will be determined by the nature of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the corresponding equilibrium points. Theorem 1. The trivial equilibrium point E 0 of system (9) is an unstable equilibrium point.
Proof. At the trivial equilibrium point E 0 (0, 0, 0, 0) the Jacobian matrix given by (13) takes the form
The eigenvalues of J(E 0 ) are given by λ 1 = λ 2 = 0, , 0), the Jacobian matrix (13) takes the form of
) and a are positive parameters, c i < a, i = 1, 2 for E 1 have economic meaning and when (12) are satisfied, then the eigenvalue λ 3 is greater than 1 and λ 4 is less than 1. Therefore E 1 is a saddle point. Similarly we can prove that E 2 is also a saddle point.
Now we investigate the local stability of the Nash equilibrium point E * . The Jacobian matrix (13) at E * is
The Nash equilibrium point is given in (10) and stability conditions are that all roots of the equation P(λ) = 0 satisfy |λ| < 1,where (15) such that
A necessary and sufficient condition for (14) to have only roots of absolute value less than one is the following (see [25] ):
According the Jury criteria, the Nash equilibrium point is locally asymptotically stable if the condition equations (16)- (20) are satisfied. When ω i , i = 1, 2 are sufficiently small and for 0 < b < 1 the Nash equilibrium point is stable, see Figs. 10-14.
Hence, we deduced from above analysis that delay has a stabilization effect for the Nash equilibrium point.
Numerical simulations
To provide some numerical evidence for the dynamical behavior of model (9), we present various numerical results here to show that the delay has the effect of increasing the stability domain. In order to study the local stability properties of the equilibrium points it is convenient to take the parameters' values as follows: a = 10, b = 0.5, c 1 = 3, c 2 = 5. Fig. 1 shows the bifurcation diagrams of q 1 with respect to α 1 in two cases: non-delay (ω 1 = ω 2 = 1, blue graph) and delay (ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.5, red graph). It also shows that the bifurcation diagram of q 1 in the non-delay case ω 1 = ω 2 = 1 (blue graph) converges to the Nash equilibrium point as α 1 < 0.27. As α 1 > 0.27, the Nash equilibrium point becomes unstable. Period-doubling bifurcations appear and finally chaotic behaviors occur. Also the bifurcation diagram of q 1 with respect to α 1 in delay case ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.5 (red graph) is plotted. The Nash equilibrium in the delayed case is converges as α 1 < 0.332. As α 1 > 0.332, the Nash equilibrium point becomes unstable. Comparing the bifurcation diagrams (blue and red), it is observed that period-doubling bifurcations are delayed in the system, as expected. Fig. 2 shows the bifurcation diagrams of q 2 with respect to α 1 in two cases: non-delay (ω 1 = ω 2 = 1, blue graph) and delay (ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.5, red graph). Also, period-doubling bifurcations are delayed in system (9) for q 2 . Fig. 3 shows the graph of the strange attractor of system (9) in the non-delay case. Phase portrait of system (9) in the delayed case ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.5 is plotted in Fig. 4 . From Figs. 1-4 , everyone can deduce that a delay has the effect of delaying a period-doubling appearance. So, the delay has a stabilization effect for the Nash equilibrium point.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the bifurcation diagrams of q 1 in two delayed cases: first when ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.1, other ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.7.
It is clear that also, that when period-doubling occurs it is later under the delay effect than those observed in the non-delay case.
Strange attractor of the delay case when ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.7 is plotted in Fig. 7 .
From above, it is clear that delay increases stability more than the case of non-delay. As an example compare the case ω 1 = ω 2 = 1 (non-delay) with ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.5 (delay). Fig. 8 shows the stability region of the Nash equilibrium point in the non-delay case. Also Fig. 9 shows the stability region of the Nash equilibrium point in the delay case when ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.5. Figs. 8 and 9 , one can see that the stability region in the delay case is larger than that in the non-delay case. Consequently firms using delay have a higher chance of reaching a Nash equilibrium point than these not using delay.
Comparing between
Figs. 10-13 show the bifurcation diagrams of q 1 with respect to ω 1 . The bifurcation diagram of q 1 with respect to ω 1 is polluted in Fig. 14. From Figs. 10-14 , we deduce that the delay increases the stability domain.
Conclusion
In this paper, a duopoly delayed bounded rationality game has been proposed and analyzed. The local stability of four equilibrium points is investigated in this game. Basic properties of the game have been analyzed by means of bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits and stability regions. From above analysis, everyone can see that the delay case increases the domain of stability. Firms using a delayed bounded rationality method have a higher chance of reaching the Nash equilibrium point than those using bounded rationality without delay.
It is important in studying oligopoly games to take the memory of the market into consideration, because, in an oligopoly it is very hard to sell all the quantity for each year in the next year. So, we must consider the oligopoly market with memory. In the near future, we will publish other papers containing more details about oligopoly games with memory. 
